Strategic Depth or Strategic Debt? Rethinking Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy in the Post-Taliban Era
When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021, the Pakistani strategic establishment was cautiously optimistic. After all, Islamabad had long envisioned a friendly regime in Afghanistan...
When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021, the Pakistani strategic establishment was cautiously optimistic. After all, Islamabad had long envisioned a friendly regime in Afghanistan as critical to its western security calculus- the concept often termed “strategic depth.” The return of the Taliban, it was believed, would provide much-needed stability on Pakistan’s western flank and serve as a bulwark against Indian influence in Afghanistan. But nearly three years later, that assumption appears to be fraying at the edges.
From Strategic Depth to Strategic Dilemma
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, historically rooted in a mix of security anxieties and regional geopolitics, had pragmatic beginnings. Sandwiched between a hostile India to the east and an unpredictable Afghanistan to the west, Pakistan’s military doctrine aimed to prevent encirclement. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, followed by a prolonged civil war and India’s cozying up to Kabul governments in the 2000s, only cemented the logic.
However, the post-2021 reality is starkly different. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), emboldened and reorganized, has found shelter across the border, launching deadly attacks within Pakistani territory. Afghan authorities under the Taliban regime have done little- if anything- to rein in the group. Worse, the Taliban’s stance on the Durand Line- a settled international border for Pakistan but a disputed colonial relic in the Afghan imagination- has remained defiant, with border skirmishes and inflammatory rhetoric.
The question now arises: did the doctrine of “strategic depth” transform into a strategic debt?
A One-Sided Brotherhood?
Islamabad has historically extended diplomatic, humanitarian, and even political support to Afghan refugees and resistance movements. As of 2023, over 3 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan- a testament to Pakistan’s generosity and regional responsibility. But reciprocity has often been missing. Despite Pakistan’s support, including during the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban government has failed to curb anti-Pakistan elements or foster constructive diplomacy. Taliban foot soldiers have even vandalized border fences- challenging not just sovereignty, but decades of bilateral understandings. Many Afghans, influenced by ethno-nationalist and anti-colonial narratives, continue to view Pakistan with suspicion, often unfairly blaming it for Afghanistan’s internal collapse.
The Indian Factor
Adding complexity is the revival of Indian influence inside Afghanistan. While New Delhi had reduced its footprint after the Taliban takeover, reports suggest it is cautiously rebuilding its diplomatic and intelligence links. The risk of Afghanistan once again becoming a launchpad for anti-Pakistan subversion cannot be ignored. Moreover, Indian media and think tanks have consistently demonized Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, using every setback as a narrative tool to isolate Islamabad diplomatically. Yet, few acknowledge the cost Pakistan has borne- from terrorism to economic fallout- due to its proximity and policy toward Afghanistan.
Rethinking the Future
It is time Pakistan rethinks its approach- not from a position of weakness, but strategic recalibration. A few points merit attention:
1. Bilateralism over Brotherhood: Friendship must be mutual. Pakistan should pursue hard diplomacy with the Taliban regime, making counterterrorism cooperation a non-negotiable prerequisite for continued engagement.
2. Durand Line is Non-Negotiable: Pakistan must assert that the border is internationally recognized, demarcated, and final- just as the world recognizes Afghanistan’s sovereignty.
3. Diversifying Afghan Engagement: While the Taliban hold power, they are not the only voice. Pakistan should engage civil society actors, ethnic minorities, and even elements of the non-Taliban opposition to broaden its diplomatic bandwidth.
4. Border Fencing and Repatriation: Completion of border fencing and regulated repatriation of undocumented Afghans must continue- not as punitive actions, but as national security imperatives.
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy needs neither an apology nor abandonment. It requires realignment. Islamabad’s vision for Afghanistan has always been one of peace, connectivity, and mutual prosperity- not subversion. But peace must be built on mutual respect, secure borders, and clear red lines. The “strategic depth” doctrine may have run its course in traditional terms, but that does not mean Pakistan is in debt. It only signals that in the shifting sands of geopolitics, doctrine must evolve- and Pakistan, once again, must lead that change.


