Beyond Legal Claims: The Political Reality of Pashtuns and the Durand Line

The debate surrounding the Durand Line has persisted for more than a century, often dominating the political discourse between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments have questioned the legitimacy of the border, portraying it as an artificial colonial imposition that divided the Pashtun population. However, beyond legal arguments and nationalist narratives lies a far more decisive factor that is frequently overlooked: the political agency and demographic reality of the Pashtuns themselves. When examined through this lens, the historical and contemporary evidence challenges the foundations of Afghanistan’s long-standing claims.

One of the most striking realities is demographic. Contrary to the perception often projected in Afghan political rhetoric, the majority of Pashtuns do not reside in Afghanistan but in Pakistan. Estimates suggest that approximately 25 to 40 million Pashtuns live in Pakistan, while around 11 to 15 million reside in Afghanistan.  This means that a significantly larger portion of the global Pashtun population lives within Pakistan’s internationally recognized borders. In demographic terms alone, Pakistan is home to the largest Pashtun population in the world.  The implication is important: any argument built around ethnic unity must first grapple with the fact that the demographic center of Pashtun society lies east of the Durand Line.

The historical dimension of the dispute also deserves careful examination. The Durand Line was established in 1893 through an agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and the British Indian government. While Afghan political narratives frequently portray this agreement as coerced or illegitimate, historical records show that the boundary was formally recognized by successive Afghan rulers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the border effectively became the international boundary inherited from British India under the widely accepted principle of uti possidetis juris, which preserves colonial administrative borders at the moment of state formation.

Equally significant is the political choice made by the Pashtuns living on the Pakistani side of the border. At the time of the partition of British India, the North-West Frontier Province held a referendum to determine its future. The electorate voted to join Pakistan, establishing the province’s constitutional place within the new state. While some Afghan leaders have historically rejected the legitimacy of this process, the political trajectory of the region since then tells a clear story. Pashtuns in Pakistan have not remained marginal or disconnected from the state; rather, they have become one of its most influential communities.

Today, Pashtuns are deeply embedded within Pakistan’s political, military, and economic institutions. They constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in the country, forming roughly fifteen percent of the population and occupying key roles across national life.  From leadership positions in politics and the armed forces to vibrant representation in commerce, culture, and media, Pashtuns have consistently contributed to shaping Pakistan’s national trajectory. Major urban centers such as Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta host some of the largest Pashtun populations in the world, reflecting a pattern of integration rather than alienation.

This reality complicates the notion that Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line exist in a state of political detachment or suppressed identity. Ethnic and tribal connections across the border certainly remain strong, as they have for centuries. Yet ethnicity alone does not determine political sovereignty. Over the past eight decades, the Pashtuns of Pakistan have developed a distinct political identity within the framework of the Pakistani federation, participating actively in democratic institutions and national governance.

Another often overlooked point is the historical misuse of identity narratives in Afghan politics. The concept of a unified “Pashtunistan” has periodically surfaced in Afghan foreign policy since the mid twentieth century, but it has never gained meaningful political traction among the Pashtuns living in Pakistan. Instead, these communities have consistently engaged with the Pakistani political system and have demonstrated their stake in the country’s constitutional order. This pattern suggests that Afghan claims based solely on ethnic solidarity fail to account for the complex political realities on the ground.

Moreover, historical interpretations used to challenge the Durand Line frequently rely on selective readings of the past. Borders across South and Central Asia were shaped by a series of treaties, imperial negotiations, and state formations over centuries. If historical fluidity alone were sufficient to redraw modern borders, the stability of the international system would be constantly at risk. The endurance of the Durand Line for more than a century reflects not only colonial history but also the political evolution of the region’s states and societies.

For Afghanistan, acknowledging these realities does not necessarily mean abandoning historical grievances or national narratives. However, it does require recognizing that the political choices of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan are an undeniable part of contemporary history. For nearly eight decades, these communities have functioned as citizens of Pakistan, shaping and strengthening the country’s institutions while maintaining their cultural identity.

Ultimately, the Durand Line debate cannot be resolved solely through legal arguments or historical reinterpretation. The lived political experience of millions of Pashtuns provides a powerful counterpoint to narratives that frame the border as an unresolved ethnic division. Whether Kabul accepts the legal framework or not, one fact remains clear: the Pashtuns on the eastern side of the Durand Line have repeatedly demonstrated their place within Pakistan’s political landscape. Ignoring this reality does little to advance regional stability, but recognizing it may open the door to a more pragmatic and cooperative future between the two neighboring states.