Pakistan’s Diplomatic Communication on Afghanistan: Realpolitik or Responsible Regionalism?
In his address at the 51st Session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar presented a cautious...
In his address at the 51st Session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar presented a cautious but strong message to the Afghan interim government. Addressing the representatives of 57 Muslim nations, Dar called upon the Kabul to live up to its promises of working against terrorism and ensuring human rights, including women’s and children’s rights. “We are still engaged actively with the Afghan Interim Government diplomatically and we have recently upgraded our diplomatic representation in Kabul to ambassadorial level. We also encourage the Afghan Interim Government to honor its counterterrorism and human rights commitments,” he said.
Dar’s remarks mark a dramatic turnaround in tone from Islamabad. While Pakistan had taken an early pragmatic stance towards the Taliban’s 2021 takeover, emphasizing humanitarian assistance and regional stability, the tone has come to shift progressively into one of conditional engagement. The move to raise diplomatic levels on the one hand, while issuing a public notice of unpaid dues on the other hand, is a finely balanced move: trying to exert influence without seeming hedonistic and trying to encourage dialogue without backing away from national security compulsions.
This re-alignment is largely a consequence of Pakistan’s own security concerns. In the last one year, terrorist attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have increased, most of which are linked to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) based in hideouts along the Afghan border. Islamabad’s constant calls to Kabul to eliminate such threats have mostly fallen on deaf ears, resulting in growing frustration in Pakistan’s security circles. The Istanbul declaration, thus, is no ordinary diplomatic calling. It is one of urgency and warning that the tolerance of Pakistan’s policymakers is running thin.
Despite this, however, Pakistan has not abandoned Afghanistan. On the sidelines of the summit, Dar had a meeting with Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to talk about the increase in bilateral cooperation and about the upcoming trilateral summit between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. The gathering demonstrates Islamabad’s abiding concern with developing regionalism as a tool to contain post-conflict instability. For Pakistan, such trilateral arrangements pose as a strategic cushion, a method of engaging Afghanistan in cooperative contexts that reward moderation and economic integration.
Zia Ahmad Takal, director of public relations in Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry, greeted Pakistan’s diplomatic promotion by saying that it would serve to increase useful cooperation between the two nations. Each nation’s expression of intent is a demonstration of a shared logic in the two capitals that both sides must continue to dialogue, even with distrust. Whether this dialogue will yield actionable results, particularly in the arena of counterterrorism, is doubtful.
Notably, Afghanistan’s ruling class is still being defensive and guarded. Political commentator Mohammad Zalmai Afghanyar’s statement encapsulated this feeling acutely: “The interim government has followed an economy-centered, non-intervention policy for the last four years. Can Pakistan make the same assurances? ” His skeptical-sounding remark emphasizes a profound regional fear. While Islamabad demands transparency and restraint of Kabul, it has to do the same domestically to maintain credibility.
This also involves responding to its own handling of rights, civil-military relations, and cross-border policies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Another important regional player, Uzbekistan, also had bilateral meetings with Muttaqi during the OIC summit. Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov reiterated Tashkent’s firm commitment to facilitating Afghanistan’s integration into regional and world economic processes. Highlighting combined infrastructure projects and the deepening of economic cooperation, the Uzbek message echoed Pakistan’s objectives, but with a more explicit economic prism. Uzbekistan’s overtures indicate there is increasing consensus among regional countries: only through integration, not isolation, can Afghanistan secure its long-term stability.
This multilateral dimension, in which Pakistan’s diplomacy, connectivity, and counterterrorism intersect, presents Pakistan with a policy window. Adding China to the trilateral summit provides additional leverage, providing both infrastructure capital and geopolitical clout. If Pakistan can coordinate its strategic interests with those of its neighbors, especially on security and economic integration, it might become a linchpin in a new regional architecture that balances great-power competition and regional instability.
The ethical undertone of Dar’s declaration, in particular the emphasis placed on women’s rights, adds a normative element to Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan. Although critics can perceive this as symbolic or contradictory, the declaration serves to enable Islamabad to project itself as a responsible regional power. In the global context where the Muslim world is often blamed for being silent over injustices within their fold, such statements enable Pakistan to show congruence with global human rights standards, at least verbally.
Yet, for such communication to register internationally, Pakistan will have to back up rhetoric with consistent domestic policies. Press freedom, gender equality, and political diversity questions about Pakistan cannot be waved aside if Islamabad wants to dominate the morality debate in Afghanistan. It also has to remain consistent about holding all state and non-state actors to the same yardstick, irrespective of what might be geopolitically convenient.
The Istanbul session came at a moment of wider geopolitical instability, with rising tensions between Iran and Israel, changing alignments within the Gulf, and ambiguity regarding the U.S. position in Central and South Asia. Against such an unstable backdrop, Pakistan’s push for dialogue and regional interaction, while holding its red lines on security and rights, is a pragmatic yet principled diplomatic position.
Ultimately, the worth of Pakistan’s words in Istanbul will not be weighed in terms of applause in summits but in actions by Islamabad and Kabul to confront the causes of instability. If this new diplomacy is measured in terms of reduced cross-border militancy, improved regional connectivity, and incremental gains in Afghan governance, then it would indeed constitute a responsible maturing of Pakistan’s strategy, not only toward Afghanistan, but toward its own future within a reconfiguring region.


