Why Pakistan’s Defense Strategy Is Being Mischaracterized?

The most recent commentary, including an article released by Estonia First indicates a tendency of the western strategic discourse to discuss the missile program in Pakistan as a threat outside of its borders. According to statements made by Tulsi Gabbard in Congress, Pakistan, along with other world powers, is building missile potentials that can strike the US homeland. Although these assertions might be useful to get internal publicity among Indians and internal security discourses, they can be easily abused to simplify and distort the strategic rationale behind the Pakistani defense posture.

Fundamentally, the missile program in Pakistan is not expansionist or revisionist. It is essentially based on deterrence, which has been developed over decades of instability in the region, especially its long-standing rivalry with India. This regional context has to be the starting point of any credible investigative analysis and not speculative global ambitions.

The strategic doctrine of Pakistan has traditionally followed the principle of minimum credible deterrence, which implies the preservation of the required level of capabilities only to prevent aggression. Pakistan does not seek to project the power of the world as major powers like United States, China, or Russia do. Its missile development path has been reactive rather than proactive- this has been mainly driven by the progress of India in the missile defense systems, space based surveillance and precision strike capabilities.

In this respect, the evaluation given by Rabia Akhtar is more grounded. She emphasizes that the changing capabilities of Pakistan are meant to provide survivability and credibility of its deterrent against the emerging threats such as the threat of preemptive strikes or efforts to disable its nuclear resources. This is in line with the accepted deterrence theory that puts second-strike capability as a stabilizing, but not an escalatory factor.

Importantly, no evidence that can be credited to show that Pakistan has intentions to attack the US homeland can be found, also the missile’s range is not able to hit the USA due to its far away geopolitical position too. These assumptions are based on the worst-case scenario thinking, which is typical of intelligence tests but should be put in a proper context. Ability is not the same as motive. Had it done so, the presence of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenals in several nations would already presuppose the imminent international conflict, which is obviously refuted by decades of nuclear restraint.

In addition, the nuclear and missile program in Pakistan is run on a strong command-and-control system, which is managed by the National Command Authority. The nation has been active in terms of interaction with the global systems of nuclear security and has been known to enhance security, especially in the field of material protection and transparency of operations. These attempts are contrary to the stories of unpredictability or recklessness of Pakistan.

The geopolitical aspect of the discourse is also subject to examination. The changing strategic alliance between India and the United States has changed the regional dynamics to a large extent. The defense pacts, joint military drills, and transfer of technology have increased the conventional and strategic capabilities of India, posing a security dilemma to Pakistan. It is not an option in such environment to have a credible deterrent but rather a necessity.

The political undertones of the original article also should be brought up. Describing the current government in Pakistan as a de facto military dictatorship in the aftermath of the events around Imran Khan injects a subjective aspect into the strategic analysis that takes away the objective aspect of the analysis. The internal political processes in Pakistan are not to be confused with the long-standing defense policies that have not changed under the civilian and military rule.

In the same way, the speculative arguments about the strategic concessions, which Pakistan is making, like the commercial port access to the United States, are not substantiated and can strengthen the false narratives. The foreign policy of Pakistan has always been inclined towards strategic autonomy, and it balances between relations with various world powers such as US, China, and other regional allies.

In a wider sense, the contribution of Pakistan to the security of the world has been underrated. It has been on the frontline in counterterrorism operations, which have cost it a lot in human and economic terms in the quest to bring stability in the region. Its nuclear policy, which is based on deterrence and not war fighting, has arguably avoided any major war in South Asia since both Pakistan and India became open nuclear powers in 1998.

The internationalization of the Pakistani missile program as a threat to the world also ignores the major fact that nuclear deterrence is effective because it does not lead to escalation. It provides a balance that prevents war by making sure that no enemy can attain a decisive military advantage. The capabilities of Pakistan should thus be perceived as an element of this balance rather than an instability anomaly.

To sum up, although vigilance and strategic assessment are vital elements of international security, they have to be based on evidence and contex, not just based on Indian insecurity. The missile program in Pakistan is a defensive tool, which is influenced by the needs of the region and is informed by a policy of restraint. Alarmist stories that transfer hypothetical danger to remote geographies dangerously jeopardize positive interaction and trust. A more moderate way would be to view Pakistan as a country that is defending in a complicated security situation and the main goal of the state is to maintain the peace by making credible deterrence and to act as a key role player as peacemaker.