Why Are Indians Crying Over Pakistan’s Loss? Look at Air India’s Losses Under Modi’s Policies

For over three months now, Pakistan and India have kept their airspace closed to each other in the aftermath of the militant attack in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir. The closure, imposed in April 2025, is a repeat of history, reminiscent of the post-Pulwama episode of 2019 when both countries engaged in tit-for-tat restrictions. The impact this time, just like then, has been felt on both sides of the border. Yet, there is a curious pattern in the way Indian media and certain public figures have responded. Instead of talking about the crippling effects on India’s own airlines, passengers, and aviation industry, they have been obsessively pointing at Pakistan’s loss of overflight revenue. In reality, the bigger damage is being absorbed by India, and it is the direct result of the reckless, confrontational policies of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.

The Origins of the Current Standoff

On 24 April 2025, following the Pahalgam incident, the Modi government fell back on its familiar playbook: swift accusations against Pakistan without presenting credible evidence, aggressive rhetoric, and an immediate escalation in measures. This included shutting Indian airspace to Pakistani flights, prompting Islamabad to respond in kind. For observers of the region, this was déjà vu. Back in February 2019, after the Pulwama attack and the subsequent Balakot airstrike, both sides closed their airspace to each other for several months. Indian airlines, including Air India, SpiceJet, Indigo, and GoAir, reported combined losses of around $80 million during that period due to longer flight routes, higher fuel costs, and schedule disruptions. One might think that such a costly lesson would discourage a repeat. Yet, here we are in 2025, with the Modi government choosing exactly the same path, knowing well the economic consequences for its own aviation sector.

Pakistan’s Measured Stance

In Islamabad, the decision to block Indian flights from using Pakistan’s airspace was explained by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif in the National Assembly. He confirmed that from 24 April to 30 June 2025, the closure reduced Pakistan’s revenue by 4.1 billion rupees. Crucially, he stressed that this was a “revenue dip”, not a devastating loss, and underscored that national sovereignty and security come before financial considerations. Equally important was his clarification that Pakistan had not shut the door on diplomacy. Even during the ongoing closure, channels for dialogue remain open. The policy, in other words, was defensive rather than vindictive. This is in sharp contrast to the Modi government’s approach, which has often been to escalate first and consider dialogue later, if at all.

The Real Economic Pain Point

While Indian commentators busy themselves with calculating Pakistan’s lost overflight fees, the real crisis is unfolding within India’s own aviation sector. Flights from India to Europe, the UK, the Middle East, and North America typically take shorter, more economical routes through Pakistan’s airspace. The closure has forced them onto longer paths over the Arabian Sea or Central Asia, dramatically increasing operational costs. Aviation analytics firm Cirium has highlighted the scale of disruption. At Delhi Airport alone, nearly 300 flights per week have been affected. This includes routes to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Europe, and North America, all of which must now endure longer flight times, greater fuel consumption, and more complex scheduling. Air India’s Chief Executive Officer, Campbell Wilson, admitted in an interview with Bloomberg that the airspace closure has “absolutely” increased the airline’s operating costs. While he noted that most non-stop operations to North America and Europe had been maintained, the financial strain was undeniable. Longer routes mean higher fuel bills, extended crew hours, and knock-on effects on aircraft maintenance cycles.

The Government’s Own Data Confirms the Problem

If anyone doubts the scale of the impact, they need only look at India’s own parliamentary record. On 7 August 2025, Minister of State for Civil Aviation Murlidhar Mohol told the Lok Sabha that in the current year, 2,458 flights had been cancelled or rescheduled due to regulatory and geopolitical issues, a figure that clearly includes the Pakistan airspace ban. Mohol also outlined the consequences of these disruptions: increased fuel consumption, higher overtime payments to flight crews, additional maintenance costs, airport handling fees, and the financial burden of rebooking passengers. In short, every day that the airspace remains closed adds to a mounting bill for Indian airlines, a bill that could have been avoided if diplomacy had been prioritised over posturing.

Lessons From 2019, and the Failure to Learn Them

The parallel with 2019 is striking. Then, as now, both sides suffered. But by the Indian government’s own admission, the closure was particularly costly for Indian carriers. In 2019, the losses were estimated at $80 million. With air traffic volumes higher in 2025 and the aviation sector already under pressure from rising fuel prices and global economic uncertainty, the damage this time could surpass those figures. What makes the current situation even more troubling is that the Modi government was fully aware of these likely consequences. The choice to repeat a policy that previously caused significant self-inflicted harm points to either a disregard for the economic well-being of the aviation sector or a deliberate willingness to trade it for perceived political gains.

A Double Failure of Diplomacy and Economics

This is, in essence, a double failure by Modi’s administration. First, it failed diplomatically by escalating tensions without presenting credible evidence, thereby closing off the possibility of a swift, negotiated resolution. Second, it failed economically by implementing a policy that hits India’s own airlines and passengers harder than it does Pakistan. Pakistan’s revenue dip from overflight fees is a minor setback compared to the sustained operational and financial stress facing Indian carriers. The irony is glaring: while Indian media and officials frame Pakistan as the main loser, the most severe losses are occurring within India’s own borders,  and they are entirely self-inflicted.

The Distraction and the Real Question

The fixation on Pakistan’s 4.1 billion rupee revenue loss serves as a distraction from the uncomfortable truth. Air India, along with other Indian airlines, is reeling under increased costs, schedule disruptions, and logistical headaches because of a decision made not in the interest of aviation efficiency or passenger convenience, but in service of a political narrative. Indians should be asking why Prime Minister Modi allowed a preventable situation to cripple the country’s aviation sector. Why, knowing the 2019 precedent, did his government choose to inflict economic harm on its own airlines? And why are the losses in fuel, time, and passenger goodwill not considered as serious as Pakistan’s modest revenue decline? The real question, then, is not “How much did Pakistan lose?” The real question is: Why is India losing so much because of Modi’s mistakes?