Baluchistan’s Untold Reality: How Feudal Elites Stalled Progress While Shifting Blame

Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest yet least developed province, has remained trapped in a cycle of underdevelopment, political instability, and economic stagnation, despite receiving increasing federal support over the years. The province is often portrayed as a victim of external neglect, yet a deeper examination reveals that its fate has been largely determined by those who have ruled it from within. For decades, Baluchistan has been controlled by a feudal and tribal elite—predominantly Sardars—who have prioritized personal power over governance, ensuring that resources remain concentrated in their hands rather than being used for public welfare. While these leaders have repeatedly accused the establishment of marginalizing Baluchistan, the reality is that they have actively resisted progress, kept the people politically and economically dependent, and mismanaged the billions allocated for development.

Since its recognition as a province in 1972, Baluchistan has been governed by Sardars who, rather than working to uplift their people, have used the political system to maintain tribal hierarchies. Every democratic transition, from the 1980s to the 1990s, saw the same elite class return to power, ensuring that governance structures remained weak while tribal influence persisted. The few attempts to introduce political reforms or industrialization were met with resistance from these leaders, who feared that modernization would undermine their control. By keeping the province disconnected from broader economic opportunities and limiting access to quality education, they successfully maintained a dependent population while amassing personal wealth through government allocations, natural resource exploitation, and political patronage.

The trend continued into the 2000s when General Pervez Musharraf’s administration launched major infrastructure projects such as Gwadar Port and the Coastal Highway, aiming to integrate Balochistan into the national economic framework. However, rather than supporting these developments, the provincial leadership opposed them, misleading the people into believing they were forms of external exploitation while secretly profiting from associated land deals. Musharraf’s government allocated significant financial resources to the province, yet the Sardars ensured that much of this investment never reached the common people. The opposition to development was not ideological but strategic—if Baluchistan prospered, the feudal elite would lose their ability to control an impoverished and dependent population.

With the return of civilian rule in 2008, Baluchistan saw record-high federal budget allocations under the 7th NFC Award, designed to address historical grievances and bring economic relief to the province. However, under Nawab Aslam Raisani’s tenure (2008-2013), financial mismanagement and corruption escalated to unprecedented levels. Despite receiving Rs. 16 billion in 2008-09, increasing to Rs. 22 billion by 2012-13, the province remained at the bottom of human development indicators. Schools that existed only on paper, ghost hospitals with missing doctors, and incomplete infrastructure projects were all evidence of how the allocated funds were being siphoned off by those in power. Instead of using these resources to build roads, industries, and public institutions, the ruling elite funneled money into personal accounts while continuing to blame Islamabad for Baluchistan’s woes.

The subsequent government of Nawab Sanaullah Zehri (2015-2018) followed the same pattern. Even though Baluchistan’s federal share reached Rs. 35 billion in 2017-18, economic conditions for ordinary citizens remained dire. The province remained cut off from industrialization, unemployment soared, and basic services were non-existent in many areas. The leadership at the time prioritized political alliances and personal enrichment over governance, ensuring that budget allocations were directed towards non-productive expenditures rather than long-term investments in public welfare. The funds meant for education, healthcare, and infrastructure were lost to systematic corruption, yet the provincial rulers continued to claim that the province was being deprived of its rightful share.

The formation of the Baluchistan Awami Party (BAP) in 2018 initially promised reform, but it quickly became clear that it was just another tool to maintain the status quo. Under Jam Kamal Khan Alyani (2018-2021) and Mir Abdul Quddus Bizenjo (2021-2023), financial mismanagement continued, with development projects failing to materialize despite unprecedented budgetary support. The province received Rs. 50.5 billion in 2020-21 and Rs. 55 billion in 2022-23, yet Gwadar—the supposed economic gateway of Pakistan—remained deprived of basic necessities like water and electricity. The provincial leadership failed to integrate Baluchistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in a way that benefitted locals, instead using land acquisitions and contracts for personal financial gain. While other provinces leveraged CPEC investments to create job opportunities, Baluchistan’s political elite ensured that locals remained excluded from decision-making, reinforcing a sense of economic marginalization.

Despite these failures, the Sardars continued to propagate the narrative that the province was being deliberately neglected by the center. This misleading argument served as a convenient cover for their own misgovernance, allowing them to maintain control over a politically and economically disenfranchised population. While they publicly criticized federal policies, they privately benefitted from state allocations, foreign investments, and resource exploitation. The protests in Gwadar in 2021-2022, where locals demanded job opportunities and basic infrastructure, were a testament to how little the people of Baluchistan had gained from years of increasing federal support. The real issue was not external neglect but internal misgovernance—the funds had been provided, but they were never used for the people.

As the political landscape shifted in 2024 with the return of Sarfraz Bugti as chief minister, the fundamental governance structure in Baluchistan remained unchanged. The same feudal and tribal networks continued to control the political system, ensuring that real decision-making remained concentrated in the hands of a privileged few. While federal allocations and economic opportunities continue to grow, the benefits are yet to reach the people. The province has the resources and the funding to thrive, yet as long as the same corrupt political elite remain in control, true progress will remain elusive.

Balochistan’s future does not depend on external interventions or increased financial support—it depends on breaking free from the stranglehold of feudal dominance and adopting governance based on merit, transparency, and accountability. The people of Baluchistan must recognize that their deprivation is not due to a lack of resources but due to those who have held power for decades, ensuring that no real development reaches them. The real question is not whether Baluchistan has been deprived of its fair share but whether its leaders have ever had any intention of using what they received for the betterment of the people. Only when governance is restructured to serve the public rather than personal interests will Baluchistan finally see the prosperity it has long been denied.

Author’s bio:

Waleed Khan Tarakai the writer of this article is a diplomatic scholar holding multiple masters in International Relations from National Defence University Islamabad, masters in Peace and Conflict Studies from University of Peshawar, masters in Media Studies from Riphah International University Islamabad. The writer previously has served in ISSRA NDU as researcher, worked as criminologist in the upper KPK and Hazara division. Worked as Peace mediator in FATA and Baluchistan, served as spokesperson Cantt Board Peshawar and Wah cantt. Practice his journalist skill on different themes hidden within society. The writer is also a Social Activist and M.D OF “Khalaq Foundation”.

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