How Bangladesh Pushes Back: Navigating India’s Regional Shadow(2023-2025)

How Bangladesh Pushes Back: Navigating India’s Regional Shadow(2023-2025)

Although Bangladesh was previously perceived as a close ally, it is showing increased frustration towards India’s predominantly unilateral approach to bilateral relations. With unresolved water-sharing agreements, cross-border violence, disproportional economic dependency, and pressures associated with hosting 1 million Rohingya refugees, Dhaka is now pushing back with prosecutions of the former Awami League government for their incompetence while also asserting its independence. Between 2023 and 2025, this push-back partially manifested with Bangladesh revising its foreign policy to accommodate closer relations with China and even re-engaging with Pakistan to escape the belt around its neck from New Delhi.

A Symbol of Unequal Power

Killing civilians along the border is arguably one of the most visible and emotive grievances in Bangladesh. Even with bilateral agreements that expressly prohibit lethal force, India’s Border Security Force (BSF) has maintained its practice of shooting those suspected of crossing the border, often impoverished villagers paying a smuggler to enter India to find work. In 2024 alone, maybe approximately 25 Bangladeshis were killed in shootings by the BSF. Between 2000-2020, more than 1,200 individuals died from BSF shootings.

These deaths – commonly of minors or civilian adults, and often unarmed – regularly ignite anger in Bangladesh. The Government have summoned Indian diplomats for consultations, and lodged protests, but India maintain their shoot and stop policy. India insists that it is a practical measure to address both narcotic smuggling, and human trafficking across the border, while Bangladesh understands it as a disproportionate and inhumane response that underlines India’s indifference to the urgencies of its smaller neighbor.

A Decade of Broken Promises

The protracted Teesta River water-sharing dispute continues to simmer. A near-final agreement was reached in 2011, but the government of West Bengal refused to agree to it, and India has not pursued a resolution on behalf of Bangladesh since then. Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed in 2015 he could resolve the issue, but as we approach 2025 that is still not fulfilled.

There has been great consequence to that stagnation. The farmers of northern Bangladesh are frustrated and angry, as they see the Teesta dry up during dry season. Bangladesh has sought Chinese assistance out of desperation. Bangladesh signed a $1 billion agreement in 2016 with a Chinese state-owned company to assist Bangladesh develop the Teesta Master Plan, an all-encompassing river management plan that prioritizes managing the river for Bangladesh’s interest, whether or not India accepts their proposals. New Delhi was understandably concerned, as involvement from China creates pressure on India to act, but for Dhaka the logic is simple: without India doing anything, somebody else is going to.

Unequal Trade and Transit Arrangements

India remains Bangladesh’s largest regional trading partner, but the relationship is marked by deep asymmetries. In 2023–24, Bangladesh faced a trade deficit of over $9 billion. Indian exports to Bangladesh totaled around $11 billion, while Bangladesh’s exports to India lagged far behind. Dhaka has long complained of tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by India that make it harder for Bangladeshi goods to access Indian markets. Meanwhile, Indian products flow freely into Bangladesh. This imbalance contributes to the view that India treats Bangladesh more as a captive market than an equal partner. Transit issues have worsened tensions. While Bangladesh has allowed India to use its land to reach the northeastern Indian states, a generous transit offer, Bangladesh receives little in return. In late 2024, Bangladesh’s telecom regulator cancelled a plan to let India route internet traffic through Bangladesh, citing fears of strategic dependence and loss of control over regional digital infrastructure. India responded by canceling a special transshipment facility that allowed Bangladeshi goods to move overland through India to Bhutan and Nepal. The cancellation, officially blamed on logistical concerns, was widely interpreted in Dhaka as retaliation, a clear message that India would use its leverage when Bangladesh steps out of line.

India’s Indifference

Since 2017, Bangladesh has hosted over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees fleeing persecution in Myanmar. The economic, social, and security burden has been enormous. While India offered some aid, it has consistently avoided pressuring Myanmar’s military regime, with whom it maintains strategic ties. Bangladesh expected India’s support in repatriating the refugees. Instead, it received diplomatic silence. Worse, India has cracked down on Rohingya refugees within its borders and even attempted deportations, reinforcing Bangladesh’s view that India wants the crisis contained within Bangladesh. China, not India, stepped in to mediate. In 2023, Beijing facilitated talks between Bangladesh and Myanmar and proposed pilot repatriation projects. While limited in scope, these efforts highlighted India’s reluctance to take regional responsibility, a missed opportunity that weakened India’s credibility in Bangladesh.

Dhaka Looks to Islamabad and Beijing

Having felt beleaguered, Bangladesh sought both old rivals and new benefactors. In 2024, after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina departed, diplomats in Dhaka finally engaged with Pakistan for the first time in more than a decade. Formal meetings took place, bilateral trade was restored directly (ending a ban of decades), and direct flights ended the inconvenience of third party air service providers. The volume of trade with Pakistan climbed by 27 percent toward the end of 2024, contrastingly; India’s trade with Bangladesh had dropped to nearly ten percent less than the previous year. Bangladesh’s military delegation to Pakistan in early 2025 was notable for apparently discussing interested in the JF-17, a multi-role combat aircraft developed jointly with China. Joint naval drills then took place between Pakistan and Bangladesh, becoming the first for both and sending a clear signal to New Delhi.

China also continues its strategic footprint in the region. In addition to Bangladesh’s Teesta deal already approved by China, China’s government funds projects that number in dozens and are mostly infrastructure. On 4 October 2023, Dhaka added to the growing list a major piece of infrastructure in opening the Bangabandhu Tunnel, South Asia’s first underwater tunnel, constructed by China. In mid-2024, Bangladesh signed 21 new MoUs with China related to trade, disaster management and digital connectivity. India became particularly uneasy with reports of China’s possible assistance in Bangladesh’s plans to return a long-abandoned airstrip, just a few miles from India’s Siliguri Corridor, to service. India was particularly alarmed by reports in 2025 that China may assist Bangladesh in developing an old airstrip in Lalmonirhat, just miles from India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor. Indian defense planners worry this could become a dual-use facility, enhancing China’s surveillance capabilities in the region.

Toward a Multipolar South Asia?

Bangladesh’s actions reflect a broader shift in South Asia. For decades, Dhaka tried to balance relations with India while avoiding strategic entanglements. But as grievances piled up and India remained unresponsive, Bangladesh began forging new paths. For India, this is a wake-up call. By underestimating Bangladesh’s frustrations, and taking Dhaka’s compliance for granted, New Delhi risks losing strategic space to Beijing and Islamabad. Bangladesh is no longer content to be seen as India’s “backyard.” Its leaders are now asserting sovereignty through diversified partnerships and bold foreign policy choices. The message from Dhaka is simple: respect must be mutual. If India wants to maintain its influence in the region, it will need to abandon its heavy-handed approach and start treating Bangladesh as a partner, not a proxy.