The Future of Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations

Sovereignty, defined by classical theorists such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes as the absolute authority of a state over its territory and population, remains the organizing principle of modern international relations. For Pakistan, sovereignty is not an abstract ideal, it is the hard won legacy of a state forged through the struggle for self-determination from colonial rule. Its foreign and defense policies consistently emphasize the protection of territorial integrity, internal order, and independent decision making.

As Field Marshal Asim Munir recently asserted, at a national workshop on Balochistan, Pakistan seeks peace and regional stability, but “never at the expense of sovereignty”. This position is grounded in realist doctrine that asserts that a state has to defend its borders and deter aggression to maintain both its autonomy and legitimacy. Within this framework, Islamabad’s approach toward Afghanistan is shaped by the conviction that dialogue and cooperation are meaningful only when the principle of non-interference is mutually respected.

From the 2020 Doha Promises to the 2025 Doha Truce

The Taliban’s reemergence in Afghanistan’s in August 2021 transformed regional security dynamics. Their 2020 Doha Agreement with the United States included a commitment that Afghan soil would not be used to threaten any other state. Pakistan, viewed this as a pivotal moment to reset ties based on mutual respect and non-aggression.

Yet by 2024, UN Security Council monitoring reports noted that the Fitnah Al-Khawarij (FAK) had regrouped in eastern Afghanistan, operating training camps and launching cross-border attacks (UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Report, July 2024). A United States Institute of Peace (USIP) assessment further observed that the Taliban’s reluctance, or inability, to curb the FAK stemmed from ideological affinity and tribal linkages rather than strategic calculation. Consequently, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal’s “Pakistan: Assessment 2025” report, Pakistan witnessed a sustained escalation in militant violence, recording at least numerous fatalities by mid-March 2025, including 120 civilians and 277 security-force personnel, in terrorism-related incidents nationwide. Complementing this, the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) documented 897 violence-linked deaths across 354 incidents during the first quarter of 2025, underscoring the persistence of insecurity and cross-border terrorism.

By October 2025, Pakistan’s patience had worn thin. After attacks by the Taliban regime and FAK on the Pakistan-Afghanistan international border, Islamabad conducted precision strikes in retaliation. Mediation by Qatar and Türkiye led to an “immediate and complete” ceasefire in Doha, followed by a commitment to convene follow up talks in Istanbul. This “2025 Doha Truce,” as reported by Xinhua and TRT World, re-established basic communication channels and mutual non-incursion pledges.

For Pakistan, the truce was not a concession but an enforcement mechanism, a final chance for the Taliban to translate their earlier promises into verifiable action.

Deterrence with Dialogue

Pakistan’s current strategy exemplifies the principle of coercive diplomacy, a concept articulated by political scientist Alexander George which states the use of limited force and credible deterrence to induce compliance without escalating to total war. Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif succinctly framed this in his post-ceasefire briefing: “No hostile acts shall emanate from Afghan territory, directly or through proxies”. In other words, Pakistan’s peace offer comes with conditions.

This approach blends deterrence and assurance. Deterrence by punishment, through military readiness and targeted operations, signals that Pakistan will respond decisively to any violation. Assurance, through dialogue, third-party mediation, and economic incentives, ensures that Kabul sees restraint as more rewarding than defiance. Such duality is coherent within realist statecraft as it maximizes security while minimizing the risks of escalation.

A 2023 report by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) highlighted that Pakistan’s border policies had evolved “from military action toward structured conflict management and peace-building.” The emphasis on hotlines, verification mechanisms, and Turkish-Qatari facilitation reflects this strategic learning curve.

The Security Dilemma and Its Management

The Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship has long been mired in what John Herz termed the security dilemma where a state’s defensive measures appear offensive to another, perpetuating conflict. Following this concept, Islamabad views the FAK presence in Afghanistan as a security threat, and their counter-terrorism is not appreciated by the Taliban regime, who give safe havens to these terrorist groups to attain legitimacy and assert control on all of Afghanistan.

The 2025 Doha Truce seeks to mitigate this dilemma through institutional mechanisms rather than rhetoric. Three key steps underpin this new architecture:

Mutual Non-Incursion Pledge

Third-Party Verification where Qatar and Türkiye will act as neutral monitors.

Structured Communication by establishing hotlines and joint liaison offices to prevent tactical incidents from escalating.

If implemented, these measures could transform the border from a flashpoint into a managed frontier. The National Defence University’s Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations: A Historical Perspective paper similarly argues that “structured bilateralism and third-party guarantees” are the only viable path toward sustainable stability. It underscores that Pakistan’s pursuit of dialogue, even after provocation, demonstrates “a preference for rules-based engagement over reactionary conflict.”

Trade as Leverage and Stabilizer

While military deterrence secures sovereignty, economic interdependence sustains it. The World Bank’s Afghanistan Development Update (2024) reported that over 46 percent of Afghan exports depend on transit through Pakistan. During the October 2025 border closure, Afghan fuel and food prices spiked by over 40 percent within weeks. This dependency gives Islamabad both leverage and incentive such that peace yields profits; conflict imposes costs.

The South Asia Economic Bulletin and Pakistani customs data indicate that total trade declined from approximately US $2 billion in 2021 to around US $1.3–1.5 billion in 2024, reflecting the impact of frequent border terrorism and transit bottlenecks. Transit trade through Pakistan was particularly affected, falling by nearly 60 percent in fiscal year 2023–24, according to Aaj News and the Pakistan Federal Board of Revenue. The Pakistan–Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce warned that prolonged closures “threaten livelihoods on the border”. These pressures reinforce Islamabad’s geo-economic argument that Kabul must choose trade over terrorism.

Under Pakistan’s conditional cooperation model, progress on counter-terror benchmarks (CTBs) unlocks economic benefits, open borders, expedited customs, and preferential trade access. Conversely, failure to act on security commitments triggers economic coercion, such as border closures and transit restrictions. The National Defence University study notes that this issue-linkage strategy, tying economic cooperation to security compliance, is central to Pakistan’s “realist peace policy”.

The Refugee Factor and Internal Security Nexus

The refugee issue adds complexity to the bilateral equation. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghans for decades but increasingly views uncontrolled migration as a security liability. In 2025 alone, over one million undocumented Afghans were repatriated (UNHCR figures). Islamabad argues that terrorist infiltration under the guise of refugee movement undermines national security.

From Pakistan’s perspective, an orderly and dignified repatriation program, backed by international agencies, would reduce cross-border friction. However, a significant obstacle remains that many Afghan refugees are unwilling to return, citing ongoing insecurity under the Taliban regime. Human rights violations, restrictions on education, especially for girls, gender-based oppression, and persistent threats to personal safety have made life in Afghanistan untenable for large segments of the population.

A “Refugee and Mobility Compact” is needed, involving data-sharing, identity verification, and phased repatriation. This mirrors Islamabad’s proposals in the Istanbul follow-up agenda, reflecting a coherent linkage between humanitarian management and counterterrorism objectives. At the same time, the Taliban regime bears responsibility to address the root causes driving refugee flows. To facilitate safe and voluntary returns, it must prioritize human rights, ensure educational access for all, promote gender equality, and take tangible steps to dismantle terrorist networks operating within its territory. Only through these measures can regional stability be strengthened and cross-border security concerns alleviated.

Conditional Cooperation

Pakistan’s proposed roadmap for post-Doha relations rests on five pillars of calibrated conditionality:

Counter-Terror Benchmarks (CTBs) including measurable Taliban actions against FAK networks, verified by mediators.

Border Governance Package like communication hotlines, liaison cells, and geo-fenced surveillance zones to prevent escalation.

Trade-for-Security Incentives with phased economic normalization tied to CTB compliance.

Refugee & Mobility Compact with orderly repatriation and data-sharing to prevent militant infiltration.

Non-Interference Pledge including restraint in rhetoric and internal affairs.

This framework, outlined in both Pakistan’s defense briefings and think tank analyses, aligns deterrence with cooperation. It ensures that Kabul’s compliance yields immediate dividends, while defiance carries proportional costs. As USIP notes, Pakistan’s approach “embeds deterrence within diplomacy,” offering a replicable model for managing asymmetric neighbors.

Likely Future Scenarios

Three plausible trajectories define the future of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations:

1. Managed Stability:

If the Taliban regime implements limited CTBs, such as relocating key FAK figures away from the border, Pakistan will likely reciprocate by normalizing trade and maintaining low-intensity engagement. This “cold peace” model mirrors the 2003 Indo-Pak ceasefire logic where deterrence holds because dialogue remains functional.

2. Ceasefire Erosion:

Should the Taliban renege on commitments, Pakistan will revert to calibrated kinetic action. “Precision deterrence”, surgical strikes coupled with diplomatic isolation, would remain Islamabad’s default mode if FAK attacks persist. The economic fallout, however, would pressure Kabul to seek renewed mediation.

3. Breakthrough Lite:

An optimistic outcome would see the Istanbul meeting institutionalize verification protocols and joint counterterror mechanisms.

The determining factor across all scenarios is verification. As the UN Monitoring Team stressed, “Verifiability, not intent, defines the success of any counterterrorism agreement with non-traditional regimes”.

Conclusion

The future of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations rests on a binary choice for Kabul, economic integration or strategic isolation. The Taliban regime, having already violated the spirit of the 2020 Doha Agreement by giving safe havens to FAK terrorists, now faces a final test under the 2025 Doha Truce. The message from Islamabad is clear, Pakistan will engage, assist, and even advocate for Afghanistan’s normalization, but only if its sovereignty is respected and its citizens are safe.

If Kabul verifiably dismantles terrorist infrastructure and honors non-incursion pledges, Pakistan is prepared to unlock trade, energy, and transit corridors that could transform Afghanistan into a regional hub rather than a pariah. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), extended westward, could integrate Afghan markets into a broader Eurasian grid, an outcome in which Afghanistan will prosper.

Conversely, continued support of the FAK or defiance of verification regimes will invite renewed isolation. As the 2025 Doha experience shows, Pakistan has both the will and capability to defend itself through precision deterrence and diplomatic alignment with global counterterror norms.

Sovereignty remains the axis around which Pakistan’s Afghan policy revolves. Dialogue and development are viable only when sovereignty is mutual and verifiable. For Afghanistan, the pragmatic path forward lies in embracing conditional cooperation, choosing trade over terror, peace over proxies, and stability over ideology. Only then can peace be durable.