Escalation and Deterrence: Strategic Rationality in Light of the Pahalgam Assault

The dastardly terror strike in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) at Pahalgam reverberated across the sub-continent bringing India and Pakistan to loggerheads. As the nuclear-armed adversaries prepare for possible military consequences, the crisis recalls tumult from their long history of conflict. Never have the stakes been higher, with war hanging in the balance. In this charged context, the big question is whether diplomacy and strategic sobriety — in India, Pakistan and the wider world — will prevail to prevent a subsequent nuclear escalation, or whether the two countries are hurtling toward disaster.

This crisis has escalated tensions between India and Pakistan dramatically, resulting in both countries mobilizing large numbers of troops near the border between the two countries. Such a situation has been seen in the past crises as well, including that of the 2001 India-Pakistan standoff and the 2019 Pulwama crisis. Considering these historical precedents, this analysis assesses the possible secondary effects of a further worsening of the situation, what strategic alternatives both sides have, and also what the international community can do to minimize the risk of a war. Full-scale war is still on the table, but a combination of military restraint, diplomatic engagement and international pressure could stave off worst-case scenarios.

Military Escalation Risks

For the the immediate dangers of the present emergency is the danger of war and military escalation. Heavy forces have been mobilised by both India and Pakistan along the LoC, the mere deployment recalling those after the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. That crisis also had both countries deploying almost a million soldiers to the border, raising fears about a new conflict. Although the risk appeared immediate, it was defused by diplomatic activity outside the two countries, notably by the United States, urging both to withdraw forces and to talk.

In light of this history, a large scloe war is quite unlikely. I don’t believe that, for one thing, but I imagine a limited military confrontation is more likely instead. Both India and Pakistan have a history of retaliatory attacks, and some have been used to achieve political and military ends without escalating into conflict on a wider battlefield, such as the Uri attack of 2016 and the 2019 Balakot strikes. These are generally directed, quite narrowly, at particular objectives, like terrorist bases or militant groups, and are within the parameters of plain old military strategy. But any tactical error or any escalation could still trigger a wider war in a region as unstable as Kashmir.

Although the two countries have a history of resorting to military posturing for demonstrating their strength, the full-dress military deployment and heightened friction create and charged environment where small skirmishes can have an escalatory effect. This is the last thing either of the two parties wants and yet is one of the real possibilities.

The Nuclear Level of Analysis: Deterrence and Brinkmanship

Adding to the complexity of the impasse is the fact that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons. Both have nuclear weapons, and the policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) acts as a deterrent to all-out war. The specter of cataclysmic results in any nuclear war really has constrained both countries in their crises. But nuclear deterrence also allows for dangerous brinkmanship. Both are likely to fight a conventional war since nuclear escalation is unthinkable.

The 2019 crisis was an instance where nuclear deterrence prevented the danger of a generalized war, thesis that shaped the entire Indian treatise in subsequent nuclear crises. Despite cross-border airstrikes and retaliations, neither side made the final leap into nuclear confrontation. This self-restraint was due in large part to the realisation that nuclear war would only result in mutual assured destruction, and the risk of full scale war was too great for either state. But the nuclear weapons also elevate the possibility of miscalculation. An ill-interpreted military move, a provocative statement or an exchange on the LoC can easily be seen as a precursor to a bigger attack, resulting in a retaliation that is overwhelming.

Nuclear deterrence is a potent deterrent but also a source of great instability, in which any military action, no matter how small, comes with the risk of escalation. As both sides continue to modernize their conventional armed forces, the shadow of nuclear escalation continues to loom large on both sides.

Role of Diplomacy at the International Level

The part played by international actors in handling this crisis cannot be exaggerated. History has demonstrated that the involvement of international powers through diplomacy has the potential power to avert conflicts between India and Pakistan. The United States was instrumental in applying pressure on both countries to disengage and resume dialogue during the 2001 crisis. Most recently, in 2019, the U.S., along with China and Russia, played a mediating role in the crisis, preventing it from escalating into an open war.

Since both India and Pakistan hold a wealth of geopolitical importance, the world permanently needs to get involved. The United States, as a strategic ally in both countries, is especially well-suited to serve as an interlocutor. Diplomatic pressure from the United States could be a potent lever to compel both countries to pull back from the brink, encouraging both to seek negotiations instead of military Wolf paths. Additionally, the regional power and Pakistan’s primary ally, China can dampen its relations in Pakistan and work in its strategic interest by pressuring Pakistan to keep the situation cool after the strike.

Furthermore, intergovernmental organisations such as United Nations might have an important role in facilitating dialogue. Although the UN has long faced criticism for its inability to mediate military conflicts on the ground, it at least offers a stage for India and Pakistan to voice their grievances and possibly achieve a peaceful outcome. Moreover, CBMs, including high-level talks, a ceasefire, and the joint war against terrorism could ease tensions and develop channels of communication for both armies. Both nations will have so much to lose in terms of international concern; International actors may also intervene by pushing for sanctions or diplomatic isolation if the two countries engage in an escalation and encourage the two to de-escalate.

Internal Political and Strategic Considerations

In making their decisions, both India and Pakistan are motivated by domestic politics. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government in India is under heavy pressure at home to respond directly to any Pakistani in the Pahalgam attack. National security and anti-Pakistan rhetoric makes for the backbone of Modi’s politics — and any perceived unmettle in dealing with Pakistan would be to risk his political credibility. A change of government in Pakistan frequently does not translate into meaningful change in the state’s security policy, due to the military’s deep-seated control over the latter. The military helping to shape foreign policy means that Pakistan’s reaction to India’s provocations is moderated, even though there is always public pressure on the leadership to adopt a tougher line.

Decisions are also complicated by the political dynamics in both the two countries. The two governments, on the one hand, must show strength in response to domestic clamor for action. They also know the dangers of a military confrontation in both sides. Counterposed pressures will force both to posture militarily while at the same time seeking to prevent an all-out war.

The Possibility of Dialogue

It offers a potential route even today, away from war to settling the crisis between India and Pakistan. The two have spoken in the past, including during periods of acute military tensions. Significantly, the 1999 Lahore Declaration, the 2001 Agra Summit and several other follow-ups also buttress the possibilities for negotiations, in spite of the intractabilities perceptibily associated with the Kashmir dispute. Third-party mediation may make it less difficult to talk, in particular if outside powers such as the United States or China encourage both countries to have substantive discussions.

Such confidence-building measures, like restoring communication channels between military commanders and sparking talks on cooperation against terrorism, could help build trust and reduce the chances for accidental escalation. Both sides have used such moves in the past, and they might provide a model for de-escalation in the current crisis. But for talks to be successful, there has to be will on both sides of the borders for talk and an acceptance that the risks and costs of war outweigh the benefits of confrontation.

Conclusion

The Pahalgam attack-crisis in India-Pakistan relations is the latest in a series of seminal events in the India-Pakistan relationship. Historically speaking, the possibility of militarization is likely, but the chances of full-blown war would be minimized by the trinity of nuclear deterrence, diplomacy and strategic restraint. Both countries can be expected to posture militarily, while shying away from a wide-ranging conflict that both know will have a terrible cost. In the end, the international community will play an important role in containment and de-escalation and diplomacy, combined with steps taken to build confidence, may be the best chance to establish long-term peace and stability in the region.