For years, the Afghan Taliban regime has projected itself as a bulwark against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), accusing Pakistan of somehow backing the group. But beneath the fog of propaganda lies a darker and more complex reality — one that UN reports, battlefield data, and ground intelligence have repeatedly confirmed. The truth is unsettling yet undeniable: both Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISKP are two faces of the same monster, bred in the same sanctuaries of eastern Afghanistan and protected under the silent patronage of Kabul’s rulers.
To understand today’s terror nexus, we must look back to 2015, when ISKP first emerged. Its founding members were not mysterious foreign radicals; they were former TTP commanders. Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, ISKP’s first emir, had served as a senior TTP leader before fleeing to Afghanistan. With him came other notorious figures such as Shahidullah Shahid and Gul Zaman Fateh — all veterans of the Pakistani Taliban who had escaped Pakistani military operations in the tribal belt.
This was not a schism of ideology but a strategic mutation. As TTP faced growing military pressure inside Pakistan, many of its fighters sought new branding and new backers. They rebranded themselves as “ISKP,” importing the flag and rhetoric of the global Islamic State while retaining the same networks, routes, and Afghan sanctuaries that had long sustained the TTP.
The pattern continued over the years. In 2013, Abu Saeed Bajauri, featured in TTP’s own Umar Media footage, later surfaced as ISKP’s third chief. In 2025, Mubariz alias Kochwan, a senior TTP commander linked with ISKP operatives in Swat and Bajaur, was killed in Dir. These are not coincidences but evidence of a continuous pipeline connecting both groups across a decade.
Despite propaganda about “ideological rivalry,” the ground reality between 2023 and 2025 shows deep operational collaboration. UN and Pakistani intelligence reports reveal that TTP remains ISKP’s main recruitment base. They share logistics, communications channels, and occasionally even claim responsibility for the same attacks — employing “strategic ambiguity” to mask coordination.
Take the July 2025 Bajaur bombing. Both groups issued claims, one describing a vehicle blast, the other a motorbike bomb. This was not confusion; it was deliberate camouflage. Behind the dual narratives stood a joint operation targeting Pakistan’s stability. Intelligence intercepts show shared planning cells operating from Nangarhar and Kunar — areas under Taliban control but effectively beyond Kabul’s accountability.
The division of labor between the two is chillingly efficient. The TTP focuses on military and law-enforcement targets, preserving a façade of “local legitimacy” by avoiding mass civilian killings. ISKP, meanwhile, handles high-casualty civilian and sectarian attacks on mosques, marketplaces, and educational institutions — allowing the TTP to deny involvement while benefiting from the resulting chaos. It is a coordinated symbiosis, not a competition.
The United Nations Security Council’s analytical reports over the past few years have reinforced these linkages. They confirm that ISKP’s so-called “Pakistan Province” (ISPP) is led by former TTP members, and that no significant clashes between TTP and ISKP have been recorded inside Afghanistan — only collaboration. This is a crucial distinction: the Taliban regime often claims to be fighting ISKP, but no verified battlefield data supports large-scale confrontations between Taliban forces and ISKP elements in the eastern provinces.
In reality, the Taliban’s campaign against ISKP appears selective and performative, targeting splinter factions while leaving core networks intact. Many ISKP leaders move freely through Nangarhar and Kunar, while TTP fighters train and regroup in adjoining areas. This unspoken truce ensures that both groups can continue their operations against Pakistan without directly threatening the Taliban’s hold on power.
The past two years have produced a string of events that underscore the TTP–ISKP nexus. The Bisham attack in May 2024, carried out against Chinese engineers, was traced to coordinated TTP–ISKP planning, raising alarm in Beijing over Afghanistan’s harboring of anti-Pakistan militants. In October 2025, after Pakistani airstrikes on terror camps, both groups launched synchronized revenge attacks in Kurram, claiming responsibility separately but using identical explosives and communication codes.
In Bajaur the same month, ISKP commander Zia-ud-Din collaborated with TTP’s Malang Bacha in joint assassination operations. Field reports suggest overlapping command structures, shared safe houses, and joint fundraising through cross-border smuggling routes. The pattern is clear: these groups operate as one organism with multiple heads.
At the heart of both movements lies the same ideological poison — Takfiri Khawarijism. This extremist doctrine legitimizes excommunication of fellow Muslims and sanctifies the killing of civilians under the guise of “purifying” Islam. Whether it flies the black flag of ISKP or the white one of TTP, the creed is the same: dismantle Muslim states, delegitimize their institutions, and plunge societies into perpetual war.
Both groups reject constitutional governance, democracy, and coexistence. Their declared goal is to destabilize Pakistan, exploit sectarian divisions, and erode the state’s capacity to protect its citizens. They feed off chaos, and Afghanistan’s permissive environment offers them the oxygen they need to survive.
The Afghan regime’s narrative that Pakistan somehow supports ISKP collapses under the weight of evidence. If Islamabad were backing ISKP, why are both ISKP and TTP relentlessly attacking Pakistani security forces, bombing mosques, and murdering polio workers? Why are their leadership councils, media outlets, and training camps located in Afghan — not Pakistani — territory?
The answer is self-evident. These groups thrive because they are protected — whether through Taliban complicity, negligence, or shared ideology. Kabul’s rulers may publicly disown them, but they turn a blind eye to their presence in Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. As long as these sanctuaries remain intact, terrorism will continue to spill across the border.
This double game not only endangers Pakistan but also undermines Afghanistan’s own security and global standing. Allowing transnational terror outfits to operate freely invites international isolation and economic collapse. The Taliban cannot seek legitimacy from the world while providing oxygen to the very extremists that threaten regional peace. For neighboring states such as China, Iran, and the Central Asian republics, the TTP–ISKP nexus represents a shared threat — demanding a unified regional counterterrorism framework.
The facts are irrefutable. TTP and ISKP are not rivals; they are siblings born from the same womb of extremism, sheltered by the same Afghan soil, and united in their mission to destabilize Pakistan. They share leaders, fighters, and ideology. Their so-called divisions are tactical illusions meant to confuse observers and diffuse accountability.
The Afghan Taliban regime must decide: continue shielding these militants and remain an international pariah, or break decisively with terror and cooperate in genuine counter-terrorism. Until that happens, Pakistan and the broader region will continue to face the wrath of these twin evils masquerading as separate entities.
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