The New Geometry of Power

The security arrangement of the West Asian region had been predicated on the basis that regional states could maintain their political sovereignty but depend on outside forces for their strategic security. This premise is no longer valid. There is a growing trend among states of the region to try and develop security arrangements that would enable them to develop strategic independence. The convergence of interests of Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, therefore, must not be seen merely as a defence pact. It is a minilateralist experiment in the region where diverse states can cooperate but maintain their independent foreign policies.

It is the very essence of the newly formed triangle because these nations do not share the same power status. Saudi Arabia has abundant economic and energy assets along with considerable diplomatic weight and strategic location in the Gulf region. Türkiye has a strong conventional military force, a rapidly developing defense industry, and its geographic location that connects Europe, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and West Asia. Pakistan, on the other hand, offers a large and seasoned military force, nuclear capability, well-developed defense industry and unique geographical location that connects South Asia with the Gulf and China.

This makes the entire equation much more strategically intriguing. Conventional partnerships generally are based on a clear-cut mutual enemy. This is not the case with the Pakistan-Türkiye-Saudi triangle. The structure of the partnership does not need these three countries to have a common adversary. Rather, this partnership can be built around mutual interests including defence manufacturing, military training, intelligence, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, strategic deterrence, and diplomacy. This very adaptability may well be its greatest virtue.

The environment in the region has sped up this process. Recent tensions between Iran and the United States have shown how quickly instability can become a threat to the energy facilities of the Gulf, its maritime trade routes, and its economic security. This development would naturally prompt governments in the region to rethink their reliance on external security assurances.

Strategic autonomy is not isolation. Strategic autonomy is about ensuring that there is enough number of partners and domestic capabilities to avoid relying on one external power.

The expanding relations between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye and Pakistan should therefore be seen as part of a larger change in Riyadh’s foreign policy strategy. Türkiye offers advanced defense technologies, military knowledge and an increasingly developed defense industry. Pakistan offers military experience and historical links to defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Through developing these relations, Saudi Arabia has more strategic choices without having to fundamentally alter its foreign relationships.

Türkiye, on the other hand, has managed to make its defence industry a tool of geopolitics. Its growing capabilities to produce drones, naval vessels, missiles and other defence equipment give the Turkish government some space for manoeuvre in foreign affairs. Its cooperation with Saudi Arabia provides economic and investment prospects, whereas cooperation with Pakistan consolidates existing relations in the defence sphere. The geography of the country adds to its attractiveness as it allows the country to tie up developments in Europe, Caucasus, Black Sea and the Middle East.

What makes Pakistan stand out in this triangle is the peculiar nature of its position. Its significance goes beyond military strength. Islamabad stands at the crossroads of several geopolitical spheres: South Asia, Gulf states, China, Central Asia, and the Islamic world at large. It may potentially be regarded as a strategic link between them.

Diplomatic engagement of Pakistan in West Asian matters further enhances this position. Diplomatic engagement in mediating U.S.-Iran talks in 2026 brought Pakistan more diplomatic attention, and R-4 process with participation of Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been another diplomatic forum to consult on regional issues. During the fourth meeting of the foreign ministers of the four countries in Cairo in June 2026, the countries have discussed the regional peace, security and stability and also pointed out the diplomatic engagements of Pakistan regarding the U.S.-Iran talks. Here it is evident that the emerging role of Islamabad goes beyond hard power and includes diplomacy as well.

Here comes the significance of the Pakistan-Turkey-Saudi alliance from an analytical perspective. Pakistan can bring not only military muscle but also geopolitical connectivity to the region. It can bridge the Gulf interests and South Asian security issues and also connect the Turkish defense capacities to Pakistani needs.

It is thus essential that such a structure be considered a network and not a traditional bloc.

Its shortcomings, however, cannot be overlooked. The three nations have different views about Iran and have different connections with the United States and different interests. It is unrealistic for them to resolve all regional crises together. Neither should the accord be seen as the birth of a “Muslim NATO.” It is too simplistic an analogy given the political complexities of the three nations.

The sustainability of the framework depends on how well its members can cope with their disagreements and cooperate institutionally.

This is the key litmus test of minilateralism. Unless this process evolves beyond the level of political rhetoric and symbolic military cooperation, it would retain little strategic significance. However, if it evolves into mechanisms that facilitate intelligence-sharing, joint maneuvers, defense production, technology transfers, maritime security and joint crisis diplomacy, then it could potentially gain real strategic significance.

In other words, the significance of this initiative will lie not so much in the language of the treaty, but in the institutional substance that it generates.

Indeed, there is also a broader regional significance in this process. This new partnership cannot be viewed in isolation from any larger geopolitical context, as a potential threat to Iran or Israel. It has a different meaning altogether – namely, the shift in regional security from dependency to regional ownership. The three countries are trying to build their own capabilities without getting themselves entrenched in any kind of bloc.

This marks a significant but subtle shift in international relations. The previous structure of regional security relied almost entirely on guarantees from the great powers. The new framework of regional security relies on diversified alliances from medium-sized and regional powers. Under this approach, states do not have to make the choice of dependence or isolation. They prefer partnership without submission.

Therefore, the Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad alliance matters not because it makes another military alliance but because it demonstrates how regional powers are responding to the increasingly unpredictable international environment. The Saudis provide economic and Gulf power; Turkey provides defensive technology and strategic location; and Pakistan provides military and nuclear resilience and access to South Asia and China.

What makes them strong is not the fact that they are alike, but that they complement each other.

And the ultimate question here is not going to be whether or not Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia would constitute a NATO for their region. Rather, the question will be whether or not these three countries would prove the fact that it is possible to achieve strategic autonomy through flexible partnership rather than rigid alliance.

This would mean that the new paradigm formed here would be a fundamental pillar of the emerging regional order – an order which would be defined by distributed security, diversified partnership and greater agency of the region.