Offensive realism and contemporary power politics

Perpetual Peace’ is a mirage so to say, as any budding power, unchecked by the incumber Superpower, can challenge and displace the Superpower. A Superpower is true ‘hegemon’ in International Relations’ (IR) parlance. Great powers fear each other, and always vie for greater share of the ‘power pie’. Each great power is in constant competition to ‘maximise its share of the world power’ normally at the expense of other powers. The usual talk of amity, rule-based order, peace and harmony are mere lip services, meant to help sustain the status quo, as changing the status quo does not favour the Superpower, given the uncertainty that such a change might bring in.

In this game of thrones, no power (great or middle order) is ever content with the current distribution of power and wants to be a ‘hegemon’ in its own right, as hegemony only ascribes true power in the international system. Therefore, great powers other than the Superpower harbour ‘revisionist intentions’ and can resort to force, to change the prevailing balance of power, if they can get away with it, at affordable or no costs. The world is hence ‘condemned to perpetual great-power competition’, as enunciated by Professor John J Mearsheimer in his seminal work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). Therefore, competition between the US and the Chinese power is endemic, and one miscalculation away from a clash.

According to the good professor, fear among states is based upon three features of the state system: the absence of a central controlling authority ‘above states’ for protection; states’ offensive military capabilities; and uncertainty about each other’s intentions. Engagement, to avoid conflict, works partially for ‘relatively less integrated great powers’ (read China and Russia), as their increased military might overtime incentivises aggression. Militarily, the balance of conventional forces is largely irrelevant among great powers in a ‘nuclearised’ environment.

The pursuit of power is, therefore, natural in great power competition just like the pursuit of money in economics. Hence China and America are destined to be adversaries. From the above construct, it is also evident that a multipolar world is more prone to conflict (proxy or direct) than unipolarity. That is ‘Offensive Realism’ in distilled form, arguing the possible ways states are presumed to survive in a dangerous world.

Proponents of ‘Realist Theory’ of IR like Hans Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations) argue that states strive to gain power, given their innate desire to have it. While ‘Realists’ believe that the structure of international system forces states to pursue power. ‘Liberal’ school of thought (also called idealist or utopian) believes that states, as main actors in international politics, have considerably different characteristics; that power is less consequential to a state’s good behaviour; that a liberal economic order and democracy are taproots of international stability; and that ‘institutions’ can push states away from conflict and promote peace.

Realists are pessimists, who argue that great powers’ behaviour is dictated by external environments and not by their characteristics. Hence states have an insatiable appetite for power to seek security, to survive and to maximise their power potential. However, relentless pursuit and accumulation of excessive power may result in confrontation of the great power(s) with the Superpower, with other great power, or with an alliance of countries (Russia vs the US/Europe). Therefore, conflict is an inevitability as ‘survival’ instinct in great powers mandates aggressive behaviour. And anarchy or systemic weakness in the international system invites aggressive behaviour.

The cited theoretical framework leads to certain conclusions.

First, the US as the sole Superpower is the only ‘hegemon’ that has been exercising global power now exclusively since the collapse of Warsaw Pact in 1989. It has the requisite experience, systems, processes to deal with power, augmented by its military might, economic power and the clout of alliances.

Second, China on the other hand is a great power and a ‘budding’ hegemon. It is working overtime to complement the US power globally, and thereafter displace it…when the environment is right. Its increasingly dominant diplomatic role in global dispute resolution, deployment of economic might under OBOR (One Belt One Road initiative) or BRI, and reorganisation and re-arming of PLA (Army, Navy and Air Force) enable it to challenge and change the global power status quo over time. And that makes it on a potential collision course with ‘Hegemon’.

Third, Hegemon must do a lot of policing to keep order. Europe needs to be embroiled in Ukraine, so that it remains firmly anchored in the US orbit under Trans-Atlantic Partnership. Look how French President Macron took a U-turn from arbitration with Russia to outright denunciation of Putin. How Germany was weaned away from energy alliance with Russia through a scuttled Nord Strom project. With the European heavy weights thus neutralised and pegged to the American foreign policy establishment, smaller European counties automatically fall in line. Hegemon, therefore, would not solicit resolution of conflict in Ukraine anytime sooner. Neither would it allow an outright victory to Moscow in the US-dominated NATO security framework, trashing the talk of ‘European security by Europeans’ by leaders like Angela Merkel. This is the Hegemon’s way of keeping the status quo.

Fourth, crisis in Europe keeps the budding great powers China and Russia off balance, not allowing them to maximise their power in international system. Hegemon might be able to arrest the Russian behaviour, however, it checkmates China through another budding great power, India…at least perceptually. Hegemon may also force an error on China vis-à-vis Japan or in Taiwan, as perceptual battle against Chinese debt-trapping the developing world has lost its sheen. As a side argument, Hegemon would never like to vanquish China from the ‘great power status’ as Beijing and Shanghai have billions in the US investments and vice versa. China also keeps the more ‘independent-minded’ India in check, whenever. ‘How di Modi’ is not more than a feel-good mantra for Indian ears beholden to Western glamour. Hegemon dexterously deploys its ‘alliance-dependence’ strategy globally…unrivalled and unrestrained.

Fifth, for Hegemon and other great powers, the Middle East is an irrelevant distraction as long as energy flows are unimpeded. Africa at best is the source of raw materials, and South-Central Asia the haven of Islamist militancy requiring a rare, unified response from Hegemon and all other great powers.

That dear reader is how the chess board is set up!