Misguided Alarmism: The West Must Not Misread Pakistan’s Deterrence Doctrine

On June 26, Globe Eye News ran a sensational report: “U.S. intelligence believes Pakistan is developing a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of reaching the United States.” This claim, now repeated in Indian and some Western media, has fueled another bout of speculations about Islamabad’s strategic intentions. But beneath the media headlines and rhetorical bluster is a more deliberate misportrayal of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. By no means are these allegations indicative of an international offensive realignment, but rather aim to manipulate regional facts and discredit Pakistan’s valid minimum deterrence strategy.

Pakistan is supposedly working alongside China to create an intercontinental ballistic missile that will carry nuclear warheads to the continental United States, according to unnamed intelligence sources. The report also states that the action is designed to discourage any U.S. military intervention in a conjectural India-Pakistan conflict. Although this characterization is provocative, it is based on thin evidence and strategic assumptions that disintegrate under scrutiny. Contrary to North Korea or Iran, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is based on regional realities rather than global ambitions. The nuclear program since its advent has aimed at deterring Indian hostility, making up for conventional imbalance, and preventing full-scale conflict in a turbulent neighborhood. The range expansion, from short-range Nasr missiles to medium-range Shaheen variants, has been a response to changing regional threats, not to project power across the world.

To truly understand Pakistan’s defense posture, one must look back to the essence of deterrence theory. A state under existential threat from all sides must have a deterrent force that is credible, survivable, and strategically ambiguous. The fact that MIRV-capable missiles such as the Ababeel are being developed is a rational reaction to India’s expanding ballistic missile defense framework, and not a statement of intercontinental ambition. The media discussion at present intentionally distorts this reason. In case of Pakistan seeking long-range systems, the intent is not to deliver them to Washington or New York, but to make it difficult for U.S. strategic calculations in the event of a South Asian escalation. In nuclear signaling, having a theoretical capability to strike distant counter value targets is not uncommon. It adds a layer of hesitation in adversarial capitals, but it does not translate to active threat posturing.

As of today, Pakistan has never publicly tested a missile with a range exceeding 2,750 kilometers, the maximum range of the Shaheen-III, which can already cover the entire Indian mainland and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It would necessitate huge investments in high-end solid-fuel propulsion, precision guidance, and long-range reentry vehicle technology, deep-space telemetry, and high-end testing ranges. None of the capabilities have been evidenced through open-source intelligence. Secondly, in a nation balancing IMF talks, FATF pressure, and economic restructuring, such an expensive and politically fraught weapons program, were it to exist, would not be missed by international monitors or Pakistan’s accountability bodies either.

December 2024 U.S. sanctions on Pakistan’s National Development Complex and related companies concerned technology transfer and component evolution, though likening rocket engine design to nuclear escalation is erroneous. Most of these elements have dual-use applications, one of which is launch vehicles for satellites, a field where Pakistan is attempting to bridge the gap with regional space initiatives. Ironically, India’s Agni-VI initiative, said to carry capabilities beyond 10,000 kilometers range, has never invoked like U.S. sanctions or strategic denunciation. The selective application of non-proliferation norms by the West only fuels the view that such systems are not meant for disarmament, but strategic consistency. This double standard is not lost on Islamabad’s or its friends.

The implication that China is assisting Pakistan in the development of an ICBM is both baseless and self-defeating. Beijing, being a signatory to the NPT and a global rising power, will not risk its international reputation by transferring such sensitive technology. Though China and Pakistan have robust defense cooperation, especially in conventional weapons and civilian nuclear technology under the watchful eye of the IAEA, strategic missile proliferation is not credibly evidenced. Attributing China-Pakistan cooperation to each and every technological advancement in Islamabad’s defense system has been an easy narrative to pitch. It overlooks the chance that Pakistan, as any independent nation, has the capability for independent technological development within a legal and strategic context.

So why this recent alarmism? The response is strategic perception management. By portraying Pakistan as a possible global nuclear belligerent, Western hawks and Indian strategists establish rationale for greater U.S.-India defense cooperation, preemptive containment against Islamabad, and regional arms racing in the name of counter proliferation. This narrative spinning is nothing new. It was used previously to rationalize Indo-U.S. nuclear agreements, missile defense research, and area surveillance programs. The actual threat is that these narratives, once mainstreamed, can become the basis of policy, leading to an arms race in South Asia and not a quest for stable durability.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has been steady. It is based on credible minimum deterrence, not maximalist brinkmanship. The nation’s two-decade, restrained strategic posture, clear command-and-control transparency, and non-provocative stance are more persuasive than unverified intelligence leaks. Rather than reinforcing unfounded fears that are neither technically nor politically based, the global community ought to emphasize regional confidence-building measures, bilateral arms control regimes, and transparency in strategy. Reducing technology development to escalation is not merely analytically sloppy, it is geopolitically risky. Neither has Pakistan threatened nor indicated that it will attack the United States. To imply the opposite is to add fuel to the fire of strategic misrepresentation, one equally consuming regional peace and international confidence.