Israeli “Solutions” for Indian Domestic Promises

A smartphone is no longer just a device for making calls or exchanging messages. It is a personal archive of someone’s life: private conversations, financial transactions, photographs, professional contacts, movements and, sometimes, the identities of people who trust them with sensitive information. In the wrong hands, access to a single device can open a window into an individual’s entire digital world. Now imagine a government acquiring increasingly sophisticated technology to unlock that world while simultaneously promising to protect its technological independence and prioritise domestic manufacturing. This is where India’s latest surveillance technology procurement raises a much larger concern.

Under Narendra Modi, ‘Make in India’ has been presented as a defining commitment to domestic manufacturing, technological self-reliance and reduced dependence on foreign suppliers. Yet, an investigation by Al Jazeera, supported by documents examined by India’s Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), has brought an uncomfortable contradiction into focus. On 7 January 2026, India’s Home Ministry approved an exemption covering 422 foreign forensic technology products, including those manufactured by Israeli company Cellebrite. A separate approval on 20 January authorised the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to acquire Cellebrite’s Premium Tool under a three-year licence at a reported cost of approximately Rs 4.98 crore. The development raises questions that go beyond procurement: why was the government’s domestic preference framework relaxed, what alternatives were considered and what safeguards govern the use of technology capable of accessing citizens’ most private digital information?

The Exception Behind the Make in India Promise

The contradiction becomes clearer when examined against the Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017. Introduced to encourage domestic manufacturing and local value addition, the framework generally requires Class-I local suppliers to demonstrate at least 50 per cent local content, while Class-II suppliers must meet a 20 per cent threshold. It also provides procurement preferences to qualifying domestic manufacturers, subject to specified conditions and exemptions.

According to the reported investigation, the National Forensic Sciences University informed the authorities that equivalent indigenous products meeting the required technical specifications were unavailable following a market assessment. The Home Ministry’s exemption covered 274 hardware products, 129 software products and 19 combined hardware-software products. It remained valid for a maximum of one year and extended to Central Forensic Science Laboratories.

This is a significant procurement decision involving a sensitive technological category. A government that has repeatedly positioned domestic manufacturing as a strategic priority must also explain how foreign procurement exceptions are assessed, justified and independently scrutinised.

Why Israeli Surveillance Technology Matters?

The Israeli connection makes the procurement particularly significant. Cellebrite, an Israeli digital-forensics company, develops technology used to unlock supported mobile devices and extract digital information for investigative purposes.

Its Premium Tool can potentially recover deleted files, examine application data and retrieve information from supported devices, depending on their operating systems, security configurations and technical limitations. Other forensic capabilities can involve cloud services and digital communications. Certain techniques may use recovered authentication tokens to access information associated with online accounts.

In practical terms, a smartphone can become an entry point into an individual’s wider digital footprint. This may include private conversations, photographs, financial information, professional contacts and location-related records. Such capabilities can serve legitimate investigative purposes, particularly when authorities are examining serious crimes and require access to digital evidence. However, their technical sophistication also creates a corresponding responsibility: the greater the capacity to access personal information, the stronger the safeguards required to prevent disproportionate intrusion.

The Privacy Gap in India’s Legal Framework

The more difficult question concerns the legal environment in which these capabilities are being acquired. In 2017, India’s Supreme Court recognised privacy as a fundamental right in its landmark Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India judgment. The ruling established that state interference with privacy must satisfy constitutional requirements, including legality, legitimate state purpose, proportionality and procedural safeguards. However, India’s legal framework governing the forensic examination of seized digital devices continues to raise questions about the scope of investigative powers and the protection of personal information.

Several provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, are relevant. Section 94 addresses the production of documents and electronic communications, while Section 105 concerns audio-video recording of search and seizure processes. Sections 106 and 185 deal with police seizure of property and investigative searches, respectively.

Separately, Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides powers relating to interception, monitoring and decryption under prescribed conditions. However, these provisions should not be interpreted as a blanket authorisation for every form of forensic extraction or unrestricted examination of a seized device.

The distinction matters. Taking possession of a smartphone for an investigation does not automatically resolve questions about the permissible scope of examining its contents, accessing unrelated personal information, retaining extracted data or sharing it with other authorities.

India’s constitutional recognition of privacy therefore faces a practical test: whether the legal and institutional safeguards governing digital investigations are sufficiently comprehensive to match the technological capabilities being acquired.

Why Civil Liberties Organisations Are Raising Concerns?

These concerns are not limited to theoretical legal arguments. India’s Internet Freedom Foundation has questioned the absence of specific and enforceable safeguards governing the extraction, retention and sharing of personal information obtained through forensic tools.

The Foundation for Media Professionals has also approached the Supreme Court seeking guidelines governing searches and seizures of digital devices. In December 2023, the Union government informed the court that the CBI Crime Manual would be followed as an interim arrangement while guidelines were being developed.

The continuing legal debate highlights an important distinction between the authority to seize a device and the authority to examine every piece of information stored within it.

A mobile phone may contain years of personal information, including material entirely unrelated to the investigation under consideration. Without clear limitations, the forensic examination of a device can extend far beyond the original investigative purpose.

Questions surrounding data minimisation, independent authorisation, retention periods, access controls and remedies against misuse therefore become central to the debate.

The Implications for Journalists and Confidential Sources

For journalists, the stakes are particularly high. A mobile device is often an essential professional archive containing confidential communications, unpublished investigations, whistleblower identities and information provided by individuals who may face consequences if their identities are exposed.

Access to such information can compromise not only a journalist’s professional independence but also the safety of confidential sources. The possibility that unrelated communications could be extracted and retained raises concerns about source protection and the ability of journalists to investigate matters of public interest without undue interference. India’s previous Pegasus controversy provides an important background to these concerns too.

When a sensitive category such as digital forensics requires extensive foreign procurement exemptions, the government must explain the gap between its industrial ambitions and actual procurement decisions.

The contradiction is difficult to overlook. A government that has made technological self-reliance a defining political promise has relaxed domestic procurement preferences to accommodate foreign forensic products, while questions about the legal safeguards governing digital extraction remain contested. India’s constitutional recognition of privacy has established an important principle, but the real test lies in its implementation.