Goodwill Is Measured by Respect for Treaties, Not by Political Narratives
When India’s Ambassador to the US, Vinay Mohan Kwatra, says that for decades, Pakistan has been undermining the goodwill that has formed the basis of the IWT, he is offering a political argument...
When India’s Ambassador to the US, Vinay Mohan Kwatra, says that for decades, Pakistan has been undermining the goodwill that has formed the basis of the IWT, he is offering a political argument rather than an accurate historical account. The issue here is not which side has perfected the art of goodwill rhetoric; the issue is which side has continued honoring the commitments made in the context of a legally-binding agreement even when relations between the two sides were very hostile.
The Indus Waters Treaty survived the wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999. It survived numerous military crises and diplomatic failures and decades of mutual distrust. If Pakistan had been spending half a century undermining the basis of the treaty, then the agreement would simply not have lasted for so long and become the world’s longest-running success story in trans-boundary water cooperation.
Today, India tries to present the treaty as something whose legitimacy hinges on how Pakistan behaves politically. This was never the understanding back in 1960. The IWT was consciously crafted to work regardless of how the relationship between the two countries stood. Water diplomacy was insulated from politics because the framers understood that the river cannot be regulated according to the vicissitudes of politics.
Another dangerous trend that needs to be discouraged is the mixing of accusations of terrorism with issues of treaty implementation. There is no precedent in international law where any country can suspend the implementation of an internationally binding treaty on the basis of a unilateral accusation of whatever kind. If this precedent is allowed to stand, then all treaties would be open to selective interpretation whenever relations sour.
When it comes to determining compliance, then goodwill needs to be applied consistently, which means it cannot be coupled with persistent threats to change river flows, break the terms of treaties or even use water for exerting pressure strategically. This behavior does more harm to the trust level between parties than any political disagreements because once a party starts perceiving its own obligations as being optional, there is no longer any trust associated with the treaty.
Pakistan has always maintained the belief that all disputes over the IWT need to be settled using the processes provided by the treaty, including the role of neutral experts and international arbitration. It is done in order to prove faith in the legal procedures instead of unilateral decisions.
There is another broader strategic implication that goes beyond South Asia. As the problem of water scarcity grows due to climate change, the rest of the world will need to rely more on the rules-based approach for river management. If the large states start claiming that the existing water treaties can be put aside anytime when relations between them deteriorate, such a move will have significant implications outside the Indus Basin. And, therefore, the problem stops being related to India and Pakistan and turns into one of the sacredness of international treaties at times of political tension.
Goodwill will not be judged by the statements made in other capitals. Goodwill is manifested not through referring to treaties in good times and ignoring them in bad times, but by adhering to commitments regardless of the state of relations with the neighbors. This is how the reliability of any treaty partner, including India, should be assessed.
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