On 24 September 2025, Pakistani security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in Dalbandin, Balochistan, targeting militants associated with the banned terrorist group(s) Fitnah al-Hindustan (FAH). The clash resulted in the deaths of terrorist Zubair Jan and his associate Nisar Ahmed, while a third individual, Jahanzaib, surrendered. According to the official account, the suspects initiated gunfire, injuring a Frontier Corps soldier. The exchange of fire ended when Zubair, refusing capture, turned his weapon on himself in accordance with FAH’s “last bullet” doctrine. This version of events was supported by Jahanzaib’s confession and an image released by FAH itself, depicting Zubair pressing a pistol under his chin.
Despite this direct evidence, separatist leaders and sympathetic voices attempted to rewrite the incident. Political figures such as Akhtar Jan Mengal cast Zubair as a martyr, while media personalities, including Sana Bucha, portrayed him as a “lion-hearted youth.” The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) framed the incident as an extrajudicial killing and amplified rhetoric of “genocide.” Their claims, widely circulated by separatist-aligned social media accounts and outlets such as The Balochistan Post, stood in direct contradiction to the evidence.
The evidence of Zubair’s militancy is clear and cannot be brushed aside. His associate Jahanzaib, a resident of Quetta’s Samungli Road, admitted after arrest that Zubair had long provided shelter to FAH operatives and organized sabotage activities. Instead of surrendering when surrounded, Zubair chose to fire on security forces, wounding an FC soldier. His final act—suicide in line with FAH’s doctrine—was not an act of resistance against tyranny but the culmination of an ideology that glorifies death over accountability. The photograph released by FAH, showing him with a pistol beneath his chin, corroborates this reality. These facts collectively dismantle the narrative that he was an innocent victim. If Zubair had been the activist separatist voices claim, why engage in gunfire? Why align with an organization dedicated to sabotage? Why choose self-destruction when surrender was possible, as Jahanzaib demonstrated?
This is not an isolated occurrence. For more than four years, every major counterterrorism operation in Balochistan has been followed by the same cycle: a militant clash or attack, an official operation, clear evidence of militant involvement, and then an orchestrated disinformation campaign portraying the dead as innocent victims.
In February 2021, three insurgents linked to the banned Baloch Republican Army were killed in Quetta during an intelligence-based operation. Despite an exchange of fire being reported, advocacy groups such as Voice for Baloch Missing Persons immediately labeled the deceased “forcibly disappeared youth,” fueling protests under the banner of a so-called “kill and dump” policy.
In October 2022, the Counter Terrorism Department conducted a raid near Noshki, eliminating three suspected fighters involved in sabotage activities. Evidence of weapons and militant affiliations was reported, but separatist activists branded the incident a “fake encounter,” portraying Tabish Waseem, Fareed, and Salal Badini as disappeared civilians.
In November 2023, militants attacked a naval base near Pasni, killing 14 personnel. Security forces responded by neutralizing four militants linked to the assault. The Balochistan Liberation Front, however, claimed the deceased were “innocent missing persons,” even though BLF’s own media released footage of the men planning the operation.
In August 2024, coordinated Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) attacks across Musakhel and other districts left more than 70 people dead, including civilians. In the aftermath, security forces eliminated several BLA operatives. The BYC and allied activists once again rejected the official account, alleging “unarmed Baloch” had been targeted and rallying international sympathy through unverified claims of state repression.
Seen in sequence, the pattern is unmistakable. Each operation follows the same trajectory: militants engage in violence, the state responds, and separatist organizations attempt to transform militants into martyrs through emotional appeals and disinformation. The Dalbandin case fits seamlessly into this continuum. Zubair’s choices—to harbor militants, to orchestrate sabotage, to open fire on security forces, and finally to commit suicide—were the actions of a terrorist, not a victim.
Zubair Jan’s death, like those before him, is not shrouded in mystery. It is part of a deliberate cycle in which terrorist violence is whitewashed into political grievance. To accept these distortions is to ignore evidence, dismiss confessions, and dishonor the lives lost to militancy in Balochistan. The facts are consistent across years: the state is confronting armed insurgency, while its opponents are manufacturing myths of martyrdom.
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