Beyond Military Aid: The Strategic Value of Pakistan to Washington
Pakistan's strategic value to the United States cannot be measured by aid assumptions. It shows up in geography, counterterrorism work and diplomacy that has helped calm crises across South Asia and...
Every few years, a new American voice, trying to gain supporters, asks why Washington spends money on Pakistan. The question draws them applause from people who are not aware of geopolitics. It also nearly always reads from the wrong ledger, the one that counts dollars and ignores what those dollars sit beside.
The latest voice belongs to Abdul El-Sayed, who has not taken his Senate seat yet but has already started this argument. The Michigan Democrat won his race on November 3rd and became the first Muslim elected to the U.S. Senate. In an NPR interview, he said American taxpayers should not pay for foreign militaries, and he named Pakistan alongside Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. On the campaign trail he said he wanted to ban unconditional foreign military aid. This arises a question: What does the United States get in return for its supposed military aid to Pakistan?
For Pakistan, that question has a strong answer, and it has little to do with the aid assumption. Pakistan’s value to the United States cannot be measured by the supposed dollars Washington provides. It shows up in geography, in counterterrorism work and in diplomacy that has helped calm two crises. Each has paid off for Washington in the past 20 months, and none of them appears on any aid ledger.
Start with the words. Military aid is a grant. Washington gives, and the recipient spends. Most of what moves between the two militaries today works differently. In December 2025 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency told Congress it had approved a $686 million sale of F-16 upgrades and support. The agency called it a sale. Pakistan is the buyer, and Lockheed Martin of Fort Worth, Texas, is the main contractor. The agency also said the package serves U.S. national security goals by keeping Pakistan interoperable with American and partner forces in counterterrorism operations.
The post-9/11 years followed the same pattern. Washington sanctioned $33.4 billion in payments to Pakistan between 2002 and 2016, by the count of U.S. data. Of that, $14.6 billion came through the Coalition Support Fund, which the paper described as payment for logistics and air support in Afghanistan rather than aid. That leaves $18.8 billion in actual aid over 15 years. Pakistan’s own war losses are placed at $123 billion. And this is only the financial cost, not including the human cost Pakistan has paid to counter terrorism.
Counterterrorism is where Pakistan delivers most directly. In March 2025 Pakistani forces arrested Mohammad Sharifullah, the ISIS-K member who planned the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members. The CIA had passed along a location tip, and Pakistan aided the United States on it. Pakistan then sent him to the United States to face trial. Trump thanked Pakistan by name in his first address to Congress.
Washington has no troops in Afghanistan, and ISIS-K still operates there. Pakistan shares the border, and it pays heavily for countering terrorism in the region. PICSS counted 664 security personnel martyred in Pakistan in 2025, the most since 2011, along with 580 civilians. The army also ran 67,023 intelligence-based operations that year.
Diplomacy is the newest and clearest case. After the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran in February, Pakistan brokered a ceasefire that began April 8. Field Marshal Asim Munir made a flurry of calls to U.S. officials in the hours before a Trump deadline expired. Three days later Islamabad hosted talks attended by Vice President JD Vance. They ran 21 hours and marked the highest-level direct contact between Washington and Tehran since 1979. They ended without a deal, yet Vance praised Pakistan from the podium. In June both sides agreed to a 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, and Field Marshal AsimMunir has since flown to Tehran five times, most recently on October 20th .
Few capitals can play this role. Pakistan is close enough to Washington to carry its messages and trusted enough in Tehran to be heard. Washington has used this route before. Henry Kissinger reached Beijing in 1971 by way of Pakistan.
The same quality matters in South Asia. India and Pakistan fought a four-day war in May 2025, the worst fighting between them since 1971, and both hold nuclear weapons. Trump announced the ceasefire on May 10. In Washington’s telling, Pakistan responded positively to American negotiation, while India developed controversies. A White House that wants no nuclear crisis in South Asia needs a peaceful country like Pakistan to be its partner.
Geography sits under all of this. Pakistan borders Afghanistan, Iran, China and India. Its port at Gwadar sits about 400 kilometers (250 miles) from the Strait of Hormuz, where nearly 20% of the world’s oil passes. Any American plan for Afghanistan or the Gulf has to reckon with that position.
The economic file points the same way. In September 2025 U.S. Strategic Metals signed a memorandum with Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization for an initial $500 million investment in critical minerals. The first shipment left on October 2, 2025 and included copper concentrate, antimony and rare earths such as neodymium and praseodymium. The deal fits a U.S. push to reduce its reliance on China for these materials.
Washington has tried to manage without Pakistan before. Relations had plummeted after successive presidents built closer ties with India. Yet in 2022, they had to come back because no other partner offers the same package. By March 2025 a U.S. president was thanking Pakistan before Congress. Washington stepped back, and it returned within a few years.
El-Sayed might be right that taxpayers deserve to know what their money buys. On Pakistan, the answer is peace, intelligence and a mediator who is heard in both Washington and Tehran.
