Afghanistan’s Taliban Has Control But Not Complete Control

The latest claims of attacks by anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan do not suggest that the Taliban is on the verge of losing power. They point to something more important: the Taliban may have won the war for national control, but it has not eliminated the conditions for armed resistance.

On 7 October, Afghanistan Green Trend (AGT), led by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, claimed that its forces shot down a Taliban helicopter in Panjshir during what it described as a “smart operation.” The group said the aircraft was an Indian-made Cheetah helicopter and claimed that two pilots and the Taliban-controlled Afghan Air Force’s chief of staff were seriously wounded.

The claim has not been independently verified. Taliban authorities have also not publicly confirmed or denied the incident.

That uncertainty is important. In Afghanistan, battlefield claims are also political messages. Every alleged ambush, casualty or downed aircraft is an attempt by an opposition group to prove that the Taliban’s security machine is not as impenetrable as it portrays it to be.

And that is precisely where the latest developments become significant.

The helicopter claim came alongside a series of other announcements from anti-Taliban factions. The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) claimed that its fighters repelled Taliban attacks in Kamdesh district of Nuristan after several hours of fighting, killing 11 Taliban fighters and wounding at least eight others. The group also claimed responsibility for an attack in Badakhshan in which five Taliban members were allegedly killed.

None of these claims has been independently verified.

But taken together, they challenge the most important narrative underpinning the Taliban’s rule: that its return to power brought Afghanistan under decisive and sustainable security control.

The reality is more complicated.

The Taliban undoubtedly controls Afghanistan at the national level. Its opponents do not currently possess the military strength, territorial reach or political infrastructure required to mount a nationwide challenge to Taliban rule.

But control is not the same as consolidation.

The persistence of armed attacks in provinces such as Panjshir, Nuristan and Badakhshan suggests that pockets of resistance remain capable of operating in Afghanistan’s difficult mountainous terrain. These groups may be too fragmented to overthrow the Taliban, but they can still impose costs, disrupt movement and keep alive the idea that Taliban authority is contested.

That distinction matters because the Taliban’s greatest security achievement since 2021 has been the reduction of large-scale warfare. The country no longer resembles the battlefield of the previous two decades, when the Taliban, the former Afghan government, US forces and other international actors were engaged in a nationwide conflict.

Yet a quieter Afghanistan is not necessarily a conflict-free Afghanistan.

The emerging resistance appears to be smaller, more dispersed and less capable of holding large areas openly. Its objective may therefore be shifting from defeating the Taliban militarily to demonstrating that the Taliban cannot completely eliminate opposition.

Panjshir is particularly important in this context.

For the Taliban, maintaining control over Panjshir is about more than territory. The province became the most powerful symbol of armed resistance to Taliban rule after 2021. For resistance groups, operating there allows them to challenge the image of an Afghanistan in which the Taliban faces no meaningful domestic opposition.

This is why even an unverified helicopter claim can carry significance far beyond the alleged incident itself.

If true, it would represent a serious tactical blow. If false or exaggerated, it can still serve as an information operation designed to demonstrate capability and maintain morale among opponents.

The Taliban faces the opposite dilemma.

Acknowledging successful attacks risks validating the opposition’s narrative. Ignoring them leaves the battlefield version of events largely uncontested.

The same dynamic can be seen in the Taliban’s own security announcements.

Taliban authorities recently claimed that their Police Special Forces arrested four alleged members of the National Resistance Front (NRF), accusing them of planning an explosives attack against the Kabul office of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

According to the Taliban, the suspects were detained before the alleged attack could take place.

That claim, too, has not been independently verified. But politically it serves a clear purpose: it presents the Taliban as a government capable of identifying and disrupting underground opposition networks before they can strike.

This reveals the central feature of Afghanistan’s post-2021 security environment.

The Taliban has largely won the battle for physical control. The remaining contest is over whether that control can be converted into durable political consolidation.

Anti-Taliban groups do not need to capture Kabul to challenge the Taliban. They only need to demonstrate that the government cannot completely suppress armed resistance, particularly in areas where geography favours guerrilla-style operations.

At the same time, the resistance groups face an equally serious problem. Repeated claims of attacks are not enough to transform fragmented armed networks into a credible national alternative. Without sustained territorial control, broader political support and the ability to coordinate across Afghanistan, these groups remain a security nuisance rather than a genuine existential threat to the Taliban.

That is why the latest reports should neither be dismissed nor exaggerated.

They do not indicate that the Taliban is losing its grip on Afghanistan.

But they do undermine the idea that Taliban rule has produced absolute security or eliminated armed opposition.

The Taliban has control of Afghanistan. What it has not achieved is complete control over the Afghan political imagination — or the complete disappearance of those willing to fight against it.

And that may ultimately be the more enduring challenge.

The future of Afghanistan’s conflict is unlikely to be decided by a single battlefield victory. It will be determined by whether the Taliban can turn military dominance into lasting political legitimacy, while preventing fragmented resistance movements from becoming a durable alternative narrative.

For now, the Taliban remains overwhelmingly stronger.

But the latest claims from Panjshir, Nuristan and Badakhshan carry a clear message: the war may be smaller, but the contest over Afghanistan is not over.