Policy Wire Analysis: Weaponization of Water Uncertainty in the Indus Basin

Wars are rarely fought over water, as they are for territory. Water does not have to be grabbed to become a strategic tool. The capacity to control when it flows, how much is available, and how predictable it is can generate leverage. This is what makes the present conflict over the Indus Waters Treaty so important for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Planning Minister, Ahsan Iqbal, has cautioned that India’s move to put the deal on hold could open the door to using water as leverage by blocking supplies during important agricultural periods and releasing them when demand is low. The warning deserves to be understood beyond the usual terms “water wars.” The real issue is not whether India can just cut off the Indus. The question is whether Pakistan’s water supply can become unpredictable due to upstream discretion.

For a downstream country, predictability means security. Pakistan relies on the Indus River for more than just water. Water is required in agriculture at several stages of the agricultural process. Reservoirs must be managed based on expected inflows. Hydropower generation is dependent on river conditions, whereas flood-management authorities demand real-time information regarding upstream flows. Even if overall annual volume remains reasonably consistent, timing disruptions might have major repercussions.

That is when the strategic significance of the Indus Waters Treaty emerges. It was not just a mechanism for apportioning the rivers between the two countries. It created a system of communications, data exchange, inspections, and dispute resolution, giving a certain element of predictability to one of the most geopolitically charged transboundary river basins in the world. Its institutional structure enabled technical disputes to be managed without turning them into geopolitical confrontations at all times.

The degradation of the mechanism, however, poses a problem much bigger than any single dam or hydropower project. It is not that Pakistan is worried about India being able to control everything upstream in order to coerce Pakistan, or about India being able to prevent the Indus River from ever reaching Pakistan. Pakistan is worried about gradual accumulation.

That is why the discussion needs to shift from the idea of “water denial” to “water uncertainty.” A river does not need to dry up to generate insecurity. For example, an insecure farmer faced with uncertainty regarding his access to irrigation at a critical period is a different situation than a farmer who is completely sure of his access to water at certain times. Also, an operator dealing with a river which provides uncertain flow would be faced with additional problems. The national security implications of all this could be considerable.

Information itself has become an important element of water security. This may sound like a technical issue, but it is also an early warning system for a downstream nation. For Pakistan, information about upstream flow makes it possible to deal with floods, regulate reservoirs, control irrigation and guard communities that are especially vulnerable. In the age of climate uncertainty, the lack of information predictability alone may constitute a security problem.

Climate change only adds to the urgency of this problem. The Indus Basin experiences changes in precipitation, glacial hazards, floods, and droughts which make water management more difficult. Hence, Pakistan is in need of predictability exactly at a time when unpredictability is becoming the characterizing feature of the natural hydrological environment. Any weakening of the existing mechanisms for the management of the shared river could only make the situation more difficult.

Pakistan’s reaction to the dispute should involve a dual-track approach. On the diplomatic and legal levels, Islamabad obviously has an interest in preserving the concept that existing international agreements on water management cannot be made null and void through unilateral actions by another state. Active diplomacy can ensure that the discussion remains within the bounds of international law and prevents the cycle of political confrontations.

At the same time, Pakistan should focus on building its internal resilience. Ahsan Iqbal’s proposal regarding construction of dams as possible buffers is crucial, but storage is only a part of the larger approach that should include better irrigation, reduction of distribution losses, better forecasts, updating agricultural practices, and improving water governance. The goal here is to avoid making the country excessively dependent on upstream water.

In addition, there is an international principle at play here. In case the political suspension of an existing transboundary water agreement becomes an accepted instrument of statecraft, this will have consequences well beyond South Asia. Transboundary rivers are sources of sustenance that span across international boundaries, and their management depends on the assumption that water agreements continue to hold relevance even in the context of worsening political relations.

Its relevance was thus not in the distribution of rivers but rather the predictability between enemies.

For Pakistan, safeguarding the Indus is increasingly becoming a question of securing its predictability along with increasing its resiliency to any kind of uncertainty. The next water crisis need not come through a deliberate shutdown of any particular river. Instead, it may arise from the changing timings, inadequate information, lack of transparency and increasing uncertainty over future flow.

It thus becomes clear that the strategic battle over the Indus is increasingly no longer about control over the water. It is more about influencing the uncertainty surrounding the water. Pakistan’s best bet in such a scenario is in maintaining its diplomatic and legal position while at the same time increasing its resiliency to any uncertainty regarding food, energy and economic security.